دانلود ترجمه مقاله مالکیت سرمایه و آگاهی بخشی قیمت سهام شرکت های پذیرفته شده

5. Conclusion - We predict and find evidence that mutual fund ownership increases stock price informativeness in China. We argue that the underlying mechanism of this influence is as follows. Institutional investors have more expertise and incentives to monitor firm than individual investors. As such, institutional investors can serve an external corporate governance role to reduce agency problem that arise from the separation of ownership and control. When managers have less incentive to expropriate shareholders or behave opportunistically, firms are less likely to withhold information and/or window dress their performance. As a result, the quality and quantity of firm-specific information released to outside investors are expected to improve as corporate governance improves. As a result, investors are able to formulate valuation decisions based on firm-specific instead of market-wide information. In other words, the stock return variations of firms are less likely to be attributed to systematic market-wide variations. Thus, this is reflected in the greater stock price informativeness that we measure. We also predict and find that state ownership moderates the positive influence of mutual fund ownership on stock price informativeness in China. We argue that the underlying rationale of this effect is as follows. Firms with higher state ownership in China receive government financial support. Such firms have less dependence on stock market for external capital to fund their investment projects. When firms are less reliant on stock market for funding, there is less need for them to communicate with investors in order to reduce information uncertainty and decrease cost of equity capital. Among firms with greater state ownership and control, the ability of institutional investors to monitor and influence is also likely to reduce since managers in such firms answer more to the state than to the stock market. The main policy implication from our study is that institutional investors should be further encouraged in weak investor protection environments that are common in emerging economies such as China. However, at the same time, in order to further realize the benefit of institutional investors as external governance mechanism, it is necessarily to expand the process of privatization.