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# Modelling the Impact of Wind Generation on Electricity Market Prices in Ireland: An Econometric versus Unit Commitment Approach

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### Abstract

The aim of this research is to assess the impact of wind generation on electricity market prices using two different approaches: an econometric regression model and a unit commitment model (the latter being a methodological approach favoured by the engineering discipline). Overall, the findings of this paper indicate that wind generation reduces the marginal price on the case study electricity system, a result which is consistent across both methodological approaches. The level of savings is non-trivial and in the order of 4 - 5.4% of total dispatch cost. It is also found that the relationship between wind and prices is linear. The majority of literature in this area uses either an econometric or a unit commitment approach but not both, thus this paper allows for the isolation of the impact of modelling approach on the results. It finds that the results from both methods are comparable and the choice of modelling approach influences the results by just 1.4%. Thus, depending on the type of analysis required, an ex-post econometric model may be preferred by policy makers to an ex-post unit commitment model given the significant reduction in data requirements and computational time involved.

JEL Classification: Q41, Q42, C51, D44

*Keywords:* Renewable Resources, Marginal Pricing, Wind, Merit Order, Unit Commitment

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, Ofgem or the Gas

### 1 1 Introduction

Climate change concerns coupled with security of supply considerations have resulted in increasing global interest in the design of sustainable electricity 3 systems to bring about emissions savings and fuel security while minimising cost. Of the low-carbon technologies currently available for electricity production, wind generation is one of the most commercially attractive and, as a 6 result, has gained a significant market share internationally. In the ten years from 2003 to 2013, global wind installations grew from 39 GW to 318 GW, an eight-fold increase, and by 2013 wind generation represented more than 2.5%of global electricity production (GWEC, 2013). In Europe in 2013, installed 10 wind penetrations reached 117 GW, meeting 8% of EU electricity consumption 11 (EWEA, 2014). 12

This growth has resulted in a greater focus on the impacts of wind on the operation of electricity systems, in particular the need for greater flexibility due to increases in volatility (Ambec and Crampes, 2012; NERC, 2009). This requirement for flexibility can be seen through the increase in trading on the intraday electricity markets in continental Europe, in part due to an increase in volatility from renewables (Weber, 2010).

<sup>19</sup> Dale *et al.* (2004); NREL (2011, 2013) and others establish that as the level

and Electricity Markets Authority. This work was conducted in part while Eleanor Denny was a visiting scholar at the Harvard Environmental Economics Programme, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 40215, USA. This work was conducted in part while Amy O'Mahoney was at Trinity College Dublin and was funded by Teagasc under the Walsh Fellowship Programme Grant number 2008013 and the Electricity Research Centre (ERC).

of wind generation increases in an electricity market, extra balancing costs are incurred in the form of additional reserve and frequency response. They indicate that as wind farms tend to be located in rural and often remote areas, wind generation can also have a significant effect on transmission reinforcement costs.

Research and experience to date has also shown that adding wind to an elec-25 tricity system results in integration costs relating to investment and opera-26 tional costs associated with the non-wind generating units (Holttinen et al., 27 2011). In particular, wind generation has been shown to result in increased 28 cycling of existing units, in other words, an increase in the number of start-ups 29 and ramping, and increased operation at part load for existing units (Denny 30 and O'Malley, 2009; Troy et al., 2010), although this cost is found to be small 31 relative to the overall cost savings of including renewables in the generation 32 mix (NREL, 2013). 33

The benefits associated with wind generation include a reduction in fossil fuel consumption for electricity generation, local and global environmental benefits, diversity of supply, reduced exposure to international fuel price fluctuations, and the meeting of national and international policy targets (Holttinen *et al.*, 2011).

<sup>39</sup> In addition, in recent years there has been a growing literature on the ben<sup>40</sup> efits of renewable generation in terms of its impact on wholesale electricity

<sup>41</sup> prices. Würzburg *et al.* (2013) provide a comprehensive overview of the exist<sup>42</sup> ing studies in this area illustrating that the vast majority of research suggests
<sup>43</sup> that increases in renewable generation result in reductions in wholesale elec<sup>44</sup> tricity prices. Würzburg *et al.* (2013) broadly classify the research in this area
<sup>45</sup> into two categories: empirical studies (using real past data, primarily employ<sup>46</sup> ing econometric techniques) and simulation based studies (using real (past))
<sup>47</sup> and hypothetical data).

Given the growing availability of ex-post data from power systems with large 48 levels of installed renewable generation, empirical studies investigating the im-49 pact of renewables on wholesale prices are increasing in prominance. Würzburg 50 et al. (2013) summarises the results from nine empirical studies on six differ-51 ent power systems which indicate a reduction in wholesale prices in the range 52 of  $\in 1.33$  to  $\in 9.90$  per MWh for each additional GWh of renewable energy 53 produced. While this range may appear large, it is sensitive to the size of 54 the underlying system and reduces to  $\in 0.06 - \in 1.34$  per MWh per additional 55 percentage of renewable generation relative to total installed capacity. 56

Within the empirical studies, there exists significant hetereogeneity in methodological approaches ranging from autoregressive techniques (Robinson, 2000; Ziel *et al.*, 2015; Woo *et al.*, 2011), to univariate (Gil *et al.*, 2012) and multivariate (Nicholson *et al.*, 2010; Woo *et al.*, 2011; Gelabert *et al.*, 2011) regression analyses. As such, Würzburg *et al.* (2013) warn that given the wide range of power systems considered and variables and techniques used, comparisons between studies (even those using the same general methods), should
be conducted with caution.

Prior to the availability of ex-post data, simulation models, such as unit com-65 mitment models, were the standard approach to quantifying impacts on power 66 system operation and costs. These models are the preferred approach of the 67 engineering discipline and are typically complex and approach a detailed rep-68 resentativeness of the underlying physical system, however, they require sig-69 nificant knowledge of the characteristics of the specific system and model tool 70 and can be computationally complex (often take many hours to converge). 71 As they are simulation models, they also have limitations with respect to 72 the accurate portrayal of the AC network and the steady state and transient 73 stability issues that come with realistic operations. Würzburg et al. (2013) 74 summarise the results from eleven simulation based studies and report whole-75 sale price reductions in the range of  $\in 0.24$  to  $\in 3.99$  per MWh per additional 76 GWh of renewable energy (or  $\in 0.02 - \epsilon 2.05$ /MWh per additional percentage 77 of renewable generation). 78

As highlighted above, the measured impacts of renewables on wholesale prices vary widely and it is unclear to what extent these variation are driven by differences in the underlying power systems or differences in the modelling approaches (and variables included). In this paper, the authors utilise both an empirical (econometric) and a simulation approach to examine the impact of wind generation on wholesale prices. Both models examine the same un-

derlying power system over the same period of time and utilise the same set of assumptions and as such isolate the impact of the methodological choice on the results. To the authors' knowledge, this paper thus represents the first paper to compare empirical and simulation methods in the examination of the impact of wind generation on wholesale prices. As such, if the results of both models are consistent, this can be considered a compelling result.

There are many physical constraints on an electricity system, such as trans-91 mission constraints, unit capacity restrictions, reserve requirements, ramping 92 restrictions, shut-down and start-up times of conventional units to name but 93 a few, which may prevent the full effect of wind generation savings from be-94 ing realised in reality. Unit commitment simulation models can account for 95 some of these physical constraints and for this reason may be preferred to 96 empirical econometric models. This is the issue at the centre of this paper - do 97 econometric models and unit commitment models produce comparable results 98 despite the fact that the former cannot explicitly account for the multitude of 99 physical constraints on the underlying system? 100

The results of this paper are likely to be of significant interest to economic policy makers who may find the data requirements of unit commitment models overly onerous for use in evaluations such as cost benefit studies. If the results of both approaches are comparable, it suggests that policy makers could use simple econometric models (such as those presented in this paper) for analyses rather than more complex unit commitment models.

This study will not attempt to estimate the costs incurred as a result of wind 107 integration, or the level of wind subsidisation required/paid, but will focus 108 instead on the quantification of the impact of wind on wholesale prices. The 109 paper considers wind generation on the electricity system in terms of its 'merit 110 order effect' on supply and demand. This premise assumes that benefits from 111 wind generation are realised by displacing conventional generation in meeting 112 demand and that there is a distribution of marginal costs for each unit in the 113 merit order stack. This will be tested through the work. 114

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 explains the merit order effect; Section 3 introduces the Irish electricity market as the case system; Section 4 details the two methodologies considered and data used; and the results, discussion and conclusion are presented in Sections 5, 6 and 7 respectively.

### 120 2 Merit Order Effect

We assume that electricity is a homogenous good, to which suppliers are indifferent between generators, as there is no product differentiation<sup>2</sup>. The market is capacity constrained; with each generator limited in their supply by the

 $<sup>^2</sup>$  This is not necessarily the case in markets with certain renewables schemes such as ROC in the UK, which is designed to incentivise renewable generation into the electricity generation market by placing an obligation on all UK suppliers of electricity to source an increasing proportion of their electricity from renewable sources (Ofgem, 2011). However, for the purposes of the theoretical model, this homogenous assumption is justified.

maximum output they are capable of producing. As a result, we can describe the generation of electricity as a Cournot oligopoly model with linear inverse demand, where generators are able to choose their level of supply but not the price which they receive for the electricity that they generate. The price of electricity, P is therefore determined by market demand, Q, times a variable component b, which corresponds to the marginal cost of electricity, and a constant, or fixed cost component, a. Thus, the price can be defined as:

$$P = a - bQ \tag{1}$$

Generators still have market power, as each firm's output decision affects theprice of electricity, and their rival's output level.

As a firm begins to generate a portion of its electricity portfolio output through 133 wind generation, it can now supply electricity at a lower average marginal cost 134 (MC) than previously (since wind has a MC = 0). The firm will benefit from 135 this change in costs in two ways; firstly due to the fact that the quantities 136 of electricity produced from competing firms are strategic substitutes i.e. as 137 wind output increases, rival generators will produce less as demand is held 138 constant; and secondly, since the Cournot-Nash outcome of a firm depends on 139 the costs of its rival. 140

Industry output will remain constant as the shift is taking place between firms
only, and demand is in no way affected by this change in supply. Consumer

prices are typically fixed in the short run, and therefore they are not affected 143 by changes in the marginal cost of generating electricity and thus demand 144 remains constant as prices shift. Increasing penetrations of responsive demand 145 may increase the price elasticity of short run demand however, as yet, installed 146 levels of responsive demand are not considered sufficiently high to impact on 147 total demand in any hour. Over the longer term, changes in wholesale prices 148 may have an impact on demand and usage behaviour (Pouris, 1987), however, 149 this is considered to be outside the scope of this paper. 150

Theoretically both firms could continue to increase the proportion of wind in their portfolio up to 100%, which would result in the same proportion of electricity being produced, but at a MC = 0. This however is not feasible in practice as it does not consider the fixed cost element of a generator's portfolio. Also, the proportion of overall system costs using this method would become less instructive as other costs (e.g. balancing) would be incurred through other cost mechanisms (e.g. bilateral contracts, ancillary services markets).

<sup>158</sup> Wind generation affects the intersection of the merit order (supply curve) with <sup>159</sup> the demand curve; Figure 1 demonstrates that it essentially shifts the supply <sup>160</sup> curve for generation to the right as more generating capacity comes online, <sup>161</sup> thereby reducing the system marginal price (SMP).

162

<sup>163</sup> Wind generation is generally consumed prior to other forms of generation due

#### Fig. 1. Sample Merit Order Effect

Note: SMP is system marginal price. Figure 1 illustrates the merit order effect over a short period of time (typically one hour) with perfectly inelastic demand. It is likely that demand would be more elastic with increasing penetrations of demand side response measures and over longer time horizons.

to its zero marginal cost and the fact that it has priority dispatch, meaning that electricity produced by wind in Europe must be given priority access to the grid by the transmission system operator unless system security dictates that it must be constrained (European Commission, 2001)<sup>3</sup>.

This is known as the Merit Order Effect (MOE), which arises from the fact that, all else equal, adding wind power to the system should replace higher marginal cost plant on the system, and this in turn is likely to lower wholesale electricity prices (Felder, 2011; Cludius *et al.*, 2014)<sup>4</sup>. Depending on the amount of wind available, the level of demand and the conventional generation cost profile in a given time period, this price reduction may vary significantly from hour to hour.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> It should be noted that depending on the connection agreement, not all wind generation is covered by priority dispatch however, for the purposes of this study, it is realistic to assume that wind generation bids at a marginal cost of zero and will be consumed prior to other forms of generation in Ireland (subject to system security constraints.) In the US, dispatch also depends on the locational marginal price at the node and not the total system marginal cost.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Assuming a non-uniform distribution of costs among the units in the range of demand. If wind displaces one unit but the next unit has similar costs, then the impact on prices may be negligible.

### 175 3 Irish Electricity System

The Irish electricity system (covering both the Republic and Northern Ireland) is an ideal test case for identifying the merit order effect of wind generation as it is a small, isolated system with limited interconnection to other systems. The time period studied in this paper is the year 2009 and in that year only one interconnector was operational with a capacity of 500 MW (representing approximately 6% of installed capacity in 2009)<sup>5</sup>.

Growth in installed wind capacity in Ireland has been relatively rapid from a 182 level of 182MW in 2002 to approximately 1,533MW at the end of 2009. This 183 figure has continued to grow since 2009 with 2,647MW installed by the end of 184 2014, representing over 21% of total installed capacity in 2014 (Eirgrid, 2014). 185 The year 2009 is the chosen year for analysis in this study as wind generation 186 made a significantly high contribution to electricity consumption (allowing for 187 a comprehensive ex-post analysis), combined with a single interconnector and 188 readily available data from the market and system operators. 189

Table 1 shows the installed capacity of renewables in 2009 was 8% with the percentage of gross electricity consumption met by renewables at 14.1%. While this is the overall level of demand met by renewables in 2009, there were instances where renewables made a much greater contribution to instantaneous

 $<sup>^5\,</sup>$  A second 500MW interconnector to the UK has subsequently been commissioned and commenced operations in 2012.

demand. For example, in 2009, there were numerous occasions when renewables met over 40% of Ireland's instantaneous electricity demand (usually
during windy nights when demand was low) (SEAI, 2010a). Thus, although
installed capacity of renewables may appear relatively modest at 8%, the contribution of renewables to the electricity system is considerably higher.

In terms of conventional generation mix, Ireland has a heavy reliance on nat-199 ural gas for electricity generation, as seen in Table 1, followed by coal-fired 200 generation. Ireland also has an indigenous peat resource which is currently 201 used to generate electricity at three power stations. The Irish government 202 supports the use of peat for electricity generation through a Public Service 203 Obligation levy on all electricity bills and it has a 'must-run' status within 204 the Irish electricity system. This implies that regardless of its marginal cost, it 205 is always dispatched to generate electricity when available. The justification for 206 this support is for security of supply reasons (to reduce Ireland's dependence 207 on imported fuels) and to support jobs in rural areas (O'Mahoney et al., 2013). 208 209

210

Table 1: Ireland's electricity supply in 2009

The Irish electricity market is known as the Single Electricity Market (SEM) and is a gross pool electricity market (with a separate capacity mechanism) that covers the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Generators bid energy and price pairs 24 hours ahead and are dispatched on a least cost basis

(subject to technical constraints). Generator bids are based on the spot price of their fuel on international fuel markets, the spot price of carbon and the efficiency of their generating station (CER, 2014). The system marginal price (as illustrated in Figure 1) in a given period is set at the marginal cost of the most expensive unit required to meet demand in the same period and is paid to all dispatched units, regardless of their bid.

Table 1 illustrates the average marginal costs across all power stations in each 221 category. After renewables and peat generation, the conventional generators on 222 the power system are dispatched to meet demand according to their marginal 223 cost bids, thus as wind penetrations grow, the most expensive conventional 224 units become displaced. In Ireland it can be seen that the most expensive units 225 are the small number of oil generators followed by gas and coal. Conventional 226 generation will tend to be displaced by wind generation in this order (subject 227 to technical constraints). 228

Payments to generators in the Irish Single Electricity Market come in three
different forms: Energy payments; Capacity payments; and Constraint payments<sup>6</sup>. Energy payments are comprised of the marginal price in the gross
pool market (as illustrated by the SMP in Figure 1) and an uplift payment.
The uplift component is paid if a generators start-up and no-load costs are not

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Ancillary service payments are paid/levied outside the Single Electricity Market by the Transmission System Operators. Subsidies are potentially a fourth payment stream to renewable generators, but are not considered part of the Single Electricity Market payment mechanism and are thus not considered in this paper.

<sup>234</sup> covered by any infra-marginal rent it receives. The uplift component represents
<sup>235</sup> approximately 25% of the average Energy Payment (CER, 2011).

Capacity Payments reward available capacity and Constraint Payments compensate generators who were underutilised compared to their dispatch schedule
e.g. as a result of transmission congestion. Capacity payments and constraint
payments represent approximately 20% and 6% of total payments made to
generators respectively (CER, 2014).

For the purposes of this paper, the focus will be on the portion of the energy 241 payment determined by the marginal price in the gross pool market. This 242 payment represents approximately 75% of energy related payments and 55% 243 of the total payments made to generators and is referred to in the market 244 documentation as the shadow price of energy. It should be noted that this 245 price is not a shadow price in the economic sense i.e. it is not the value of 246 the Lagrange multiplier at the optimal solution. However, the Irish market 247 documentation refers to the shadow price (essentially SMP in Figure 1) so for 248 consistency we will continue to use this terminology here (CER, 2011). 240

It should be noted that the results of this study are relevant for the year 2009 only and the market structure assumed in this paper could change significantly with the introduction of the integrated single European market (I-SEM, 2014). Thus, the results presented here are limited to the Irish market in 2009 and inference of the results beyond this scope should be done with caution.

### 255 4 Methods

This article uses two different methods to examine the impact of wind generation on the marginal wholesale electricity price (the shadow price) in the Irish electricity market. The first model is a multivariate time series regression model using historical data. The second model is a unit commitment simulation model utilising the same historical data. Both methodological approaches are discussed in this section.

### 262 4.1 Regression Model

In this study we generate a time series multiple regression model using Irish 263 hourly data for 2009 from the Single Electricity Market (SEM). It is expected 264 for the Irish system that the most accurate predictors of the shadow price in 265 any hour would be the fuel input prices of gas, coal, oil and carbon from the 266 day prior to bidding (when bids must be made), and the demand in that hour. 267 The merit order effect implies that wind generation will reduce the amount 268 of conventional generation required to meet demand and thereby reduce the 269 price, thus, wind generation is also hypothesised to have an impact on the 270 shadow price. 271

The basic inverse supply function to be estimated is expressed in equation 2:

$$ShadowPrice_{t} = \alpha + \beta_{1}NetDemand_{t} + \beta_{2}NetDemand_{t}^{2}$$

$$-\beta_{3}Wind_{t} - \beta_{4}Wind_{t}^{2}$$

$$+\beta_{5}Gas_{t-24} + \beta_{6}Coal_{t-24} + \beta_{7}Oil_{t-24}$$

$$+\beta_{8}Carbon_{t-24}X_{t} + \beta_{9}D + \epsilon_{t}$$

$$(2)$$

NetDemand refers to total system demand at time t less demand that is met through peat output, hydro generation and electricity imports since none of these units bid into the Irish electricity market in 2009. NetDemand is measured on an hourly basis and represents the total hourly demand which must be met by supply from the conventional units (except peat) and wind generation. NetDemand<sup>2</sup> is also included to allow a non-linear relationship between price and demand.

 $Wind_t$  is the total wind output at time t. We expect wind to have a negative sign as our hypothesis is that wind will reduce the price of electricity at any given time. We include a square term in order to allow the relationship between the price and wind to be non-linear.

The bidding rules of the Irish electricity market require units to submit market bids into the gross pool auction based on the spot price of fuel and carbon, and their individual marginal heat rate i.e. their fuel consumption and carbon cost per MWh. Thus, *Gas, Coal, Oil* and *Carbon* relate to the daily spot prices

of these fuels on the global spot exchange markets and reflect the spot prices
used in generator bids. In practice, these fuel prices are bid into the market
on a day-ahead basis, and therefore are lagged by 24 periods.

<sup>290</sup> Controls are included for hour of the day, day of the week, month and public <sup>291</sup> holidays (represented by D in equation 2), as all of these have an effect on <sup>292</sup> the demand for electricity, the availability of wind for generation, and the <sup>293</sup> scheduled maintenance of conventional plant, which additionally has an effect <sup>294</sup> on the fuel mix (Thomas *et al.*, 2011).

Given the potential multicollinearity issues of including both NetDemand and  $NetDemand^2$ , and  $Wind_t$  with its square term, the model presented in equation 2 is also estimated with data for NetDemand and Wind centred around their mean. This is shown in equation 3 below where NetDemandCentered and  $WindCentered_t$  refer to variables which are centred around their mean values.

$$ShadowPrice_{t} = \alpha + \beta_{1}NetDemandCentred_{t} + \beta_{2}NetDemandCentred_{t}^{2}$$
$$-\beta_{3}WindCentred_{t} - \beta_{4}WindCentred_{t}^{2}$$
$$+\beta_{5}Gas_{t-24} + \beta_{6}Coal_{t-24} + \beta_{7}Oil_{t-24}$$
$$+\beta_{8}Carbon_{t-24}X_{t} + \beta_{9}D + \epsilon_{t}$$
(3)

<sup>295</sup> The shadow price of electricity is set at the marginal cost of the most expen-

sive generator required to meet demand in a given period, and each MWh 296 generated receives the same shadow price. Thus, a reduction in this price due 297 to wind, reduces the price paid to each generator for each unit of electricity 298 that they produce. This allows us to calculate the total saving for every hour 299 of each day which is attributable to wind. We can calculate the total savings 300 from wind based on this average value by multiplying the coefficient for  $Wind_t$ 301 by the actual wind output per hour and the demand per hour, as shown in 302 equation 4. 303

$$TotalSavings = \sum_{t=1}^{8736} \left(-0.0034 * Wind_t * NetDemand_t\right)$$
(4)

This paper also examines the impact of wind generation on prices during different hours of the day using hourly interactions. The hourly interaction model to be estimated is presented in equation 5, where *Hour* is a matrix of dummy variables representing each hour of the day. The model is estimated without an intercept in equation 5 to allow each of the interaction terms to be estimated (Cludius *et al.*, 2014). *WindCentred*<sub>t</sub> is also dropped due to perfect

collinearity with the full matrix of interaction terms.

 $ShadowPrice_t = \beta_1 NetDemandCentred_t + \beta_2 NetDemandCentred_t^2$ 

$$-\beta_{3}WindCentred_{t}^{2} - \beta_{4}(WindCentred_{t} * Hour)$$
$$+\beta_{5}Gas_{t-24} + \beta_{6}Coal_{t-24} + \beta_{7}Oil_{t-24}$$
$$+\beta_{8}Carbon_{t-24}X_{t} + \beta_{9}D + \epsilon_{t}$$

(5)

In order to quantify hourly price reduction benefit of wind, the hourly coefficient for the interaction term  $WindCentred_t * Hour (\beta_4 \text{ from equation 5})$  is multiplied by the historical wind output and system demand for each hour of 2009, as shown in equation 6 below.

$$TotalHourlySavings = \sum_{t=1}^{8736} \left(\beta_{4t} * Wind_t\right) \left(NetDemand_t\right) \tag{6}$$

It should be noted that the regression models are aggregate models which do not explicitly include individual generator data or physical system characteristics. The simulation model, which is described in the following section, is a much more detailed model and includes individual generation unit characteristics and system requirements (such as reserve constraints). 313 4.2 The Unit Commitment Simulation Model

The second method of evaluating the impact of wind generation on electricity 314 prices is conducted using a simulation model of the Irish electricity system for 315 the same period in 2009. This simulation model runs on the Plexos electricity 316 modelling software platform (Energy Exemplar, 2013a) and is similarly config-317 ured to the model used by the Irish regulatory authorities for this period. The 318 model handles both the unit commitment, which determines the commitment 319 schedule of units (Kiviluoma et al., 2012), and the economic dispatch, which 320 relates to the dispatch levels of those units (Baldick, 1995). It also replicates 321 the energy pricing formulation used in the Irish wholesale electricity market 322 and estimates the shadow prices which are of interest to this study. 323

Equation 7 describes the cost function which is minimised in the unit commitment simulation model for all i generating units on the Irish system for every hour t:

$$\min\left(\sum_{i=1}^{N} Start \ costs_{i} + \sum_{i=1}^{N} No \ loadcosts_{i} + \sum_{i=1}^{N} Marginal \ Cost_{i,t} * Output_{i,t} + \sum_{i=1}^{N} Reserve \ Cost_{i,t}\right)$$
(7)  
subject to :  $\sum_{i=1}^{N} Generation_{i}, t = \sum_{i=1}^{N} Demand_{i}, t$ 

Generators are assumed to have montonically non-decreasing piecewise linear bids for energy and reserve and the constraints included are load balance,

reserve capacity requirement, and maximum and minimum rated capacities.
Other costs and constraints include no load costs, start up and shut down
costs, carbon costs, and constraints such as minimum generation, start up
constraints, and maximum and minimum ramping up and down times. Generator availability schedules are also included. The full mathematical details
of all the constraints are available in Energy Exemplar (2013b).

Unit commitment and economic dispatch is carried out using a rounded re-332 laxation optimisation process using the Xpress suite (Fair Isaac Corporation, 333 2013). Using piece-wise linear heat rates and generator characteristics, gen-334 erating plants are represented individually in the Irish market. A lumped 335 generator model of the Great Britain market is included, as well as 500 MW 336 of interconnection to the Irish system which was the case in 2009. Wind and 337 hydro generation were modelled as price taker units within this simulation 338 model as they are in practice. 339

In order to compare the results of the econometric and unit commitment models, they are both run with identical input data for net demand, wind output, fuel and carbon prices, however the simulation model also captures generator level data and system constraints which are not included in the regression model.

It is thus obvious that the simulation model provides much more detail about
the operation of the Irish electricity system which cannot be captured using

time series econometrics. While the unit commitment model falls short of a true system representation, it does capture the significant majority of the operation costs. This rigour requires significant data input and knowledge of the underlying system which can be logistically time consuming to gather and compute. The regression model requires significantly less data, computation time and knowledge of the underlying system, however, the key research question is whether the two different methodologies provide similar results.

355 4.3 Data

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Table 2 provides summary statistics for each of the variables included within this study on an hourly basis. Data for the shadow price is taken from the market operator's website, which provides data on a half hourly basis since the inception of the Single Electricity Market in 2007 (SEM, 2013). Hourly data is generated by averaging half-hourly observations.

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### Table 2: Summary Statistics

Net demand is calculated as total system demand minus the output of the peat stations, hydro units and interconnector flows, the data for which were obtained from the transmission system operator's website and the market operators website (Eirgrid, 2013; SEM, 2013).

Wind data is published on the Eirgrid website for the Republic of Ireland, and data for Northern Ireland was provided by the system operator in Northern Ireland (Eirgrid, 2013; SONI, 2010). Fuel and carbon prices were taken from daily global exchanges, and converted into euro using historical exchange rates.

The data presented in Table 2 is included in both the econometric and unit commitment models for consistency.

### 373 5 Results & Discussion

374 5.1 Regression Model Results

Table 3 presents the results of the main drivers of the shadow price using a number of different specifications of the regression model presented in Equation 2. Serial correlation was found, thus estimations are made using Generalised Least Squares - Prais Winston techniques with robust standard errors.

#### 380

Table 3: Basic Regression Model Results

Examining model specifications 1a and 1b first, it can be seen that net demand has a positive significant effect on the price. This is expected since an increase in net demand causes a movement up the merit curve to more expensive generating units, causing the price to increase. For example, from model

1b, a 100MW increase in net demand causes a €1.42/MWh increase in the
price. Irish demand can be seen to be highly cyclical and predictable, as are
the prices over time. This is illustrated in Figure 2, which presents Demand
and Price in the first business week of January 2009.

389

Fig. 2. Load & Shadow Price for first business week in January 2009

Note: Demand data sourced from the Transmission System Operator's website (Eirgrid, 2013). Price data sourced from the Market Operator's website (SEM, 2013).

It can be seen from Model 1c and 1d that although the square of net demand is statistically significant, it has a coefficient of close to zero (actual coefficient is 0.00000198) and is thus not considered economically significant. Thus, we can deduce that there is an virtually linear relationship between prices and demand for 2009.

Models 1b and 1c show that the coefficient on *Wind* is negative and statistically 395 significant at the 99% level. This implies that increases in wind generation 396 reduce the system marginal price - a finding consistent with the merit order 397 hypothesis and the majority of literature in this field (Würzburg *et al.*, 2013). 398 The squared output of wind is found to be significant in Model 1d, however, 399 it has a coefficient of zero (actual coefficient -0.000000105) and therefore is 400 not of economic consequence. Thus, we see a linear relationship between wind 401 and prices. 402

Gas and oil prices are seen to be consistent and statistically significantly positive across Models 1a to 1d. This is to be expected as the marginal units on the Irish system are gas and oil fired and are thus most likely to be the price setters. As coal serves as a baseload fuel it is rarely the marginal unit and thus does not tend to directly affect the shadow price of electricity. This is evident in the small and insignificant coefficient for coal prices.

Model 1e provides the full specification of the basic model from equation 2, 409 however, it can be seen that this model appears to be unstable with an un-410 expected negative coefficient on net demand (implying that an increase in 411 demand reduces price). This is not the case in reality, as seen from Figure 412 2, and is expected to result from multicollinearity between Netdemand and 413 Wind with their squared terms. As such, Equation 3 presents a model with 414 centred data to deal with this multicollinearity issue and the results of this 415 model are presented in Table 4. 416

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### Table 4: Centred Regression Model Results

The result from models 2a and 2b are consistent and variables present the expected coefficients. It appears that centring the data has dealt with the multicollinearity issue and model 2b is considered a better representation than that presented in model specification 1e previously. It can be seen  $NetDemandcentred^2$ and  $Windcentred^2$  have coefficients of zero, again confirming their linear re $_{424}$  lationship with price<sup>7</sup>.

The coefficient for wind generation is consistent across both models, -0.0030425 and -0.0034 for models 2a and 2b respectively. Looking at the Akaike and 426 Bayesian information criteria we see that of these two model specifications, 427 the most appropriate model (the one with the smallest AIC/BIC values) is 428 model 2b. The results of this model find that an increase of 1 GWh of wind 429 on the Irish system led, on average over the course of 2009, to a fall in the 430 shadow price of  $\in 3.40$ /MWh. This is closely aligned to the results of other 431 empirical studies examining the impact of wind generation on wholesale prices. 432 For example, Würzburg et al. (2013) summarise the results from empirical 433 studies in seven different countries and show that the average impact of wind 434 generation on wholesale prices is  $\in 3.81/MWh$  for each additional GWh of 435 wind. 436

In isolation, the impact of wind may not seem to be a significant amount, particularly given that the mean Shadow Price is  $\in$  36.22, however, this saving represents the *average* impact per MWh of wind generation on the *average* shadow price. Using equation 4 it is found that the total savings from wind generation (using the average saving per MWh) are  $\in$  44.36 million, which represents a saving of 3.76% on the total annual dispatch cost.

443 It may be the case that the savings from wind vary throughout the day and

 $<sup>^7\,</sup>$  Higher order powers of NetDemand and Wind were also tested and were found to also have coefficients of zero.

provide greater reductions at times of higher prices. Thus, Table 5 presents the
savings from wind generation on an hourly basis found by estimating equation
5. Coefficients for the interaction term *Wind*\**Hour* are presented horizontally
for ease of presentation.

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### Table 5: Hourly Results

It can be seen from Table 5 that the value of wind generation changes throughout the day based on the different marginal units that are displaced throughout the day. For example, it can be seen that, on average, wind has a maximum benefit at 6pm when prices tend to be among their highest.

Since wind reduces the demand for generation with higher marginal costs, its 454 value depends on the demand at the time and the cost of the units it displaces 455 relative to the new marginal unit. Given the range of savings when examined 456 on an hourly basis, it may be the case that the hourly coefficient provides 457 a truer indication of shadow price savings rather than the overall average 458 coefficient. While the overall average reduction is  $\in 3.40$  per GWh of wind, the 459 value of a reduction in electricity price at peak hours is much more beneficial 460 to consumers than a reduction during the night. Thus, when analysing the 461 overall benefit of wind generation on price reduction we can use these hourly 462 coefficients rather than the overall average of  $\in 0.0034$ /MWh. 463

464 Estimating equation 6 finds that the value of wind to the market dispatch

resulted in savings of €46.99 million in 2009 which represents a saving of 4% over the total market dispatch cost. In other words, the hourly econometric model suggests that the total market dispatch costs would have been 4% higher in 2009 in the absence of wind. This value, which was calculated using the hourly coefficients, is slightly higher than the value of wind found using the average savings (of €0.0034/MWh) as savings during the peak hours of 6 and 7pm would have a higher benefit than savings during the night.

472 5.2 Simulation Results

The unit commitment model was run using the Irish Commission for Energy 473 Regulation's Validated Backcast Model for 2009, which uses actual plant avail-474 ability and forced and scheduled outage rates for 2009 in order for it to mimic 475 the true operation of the system (CER, 2010; Energy Exemplar, 2013a). In this 476 paper we also include historical time series values of wind output, demand, fuel 477 and carbon prices which are identical to those used in the regression model. 478 The unit commitment model simulates the operation of the Irish system on 479 an hourly basis and provides the hourly shadow price as an output. 480

This model was run twice, first assuming zero wind, and then a second time including the wind output time series for 2009. Table 6 presents the simulation summary statistics for the shadow price under the 'without wind' and 'with wind' scenarios. 485

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### Table 6: Summary Statistics from the Unit Commitment Model

These simulated results are relatively close to the true historical values of the 487 shadow price, with a slightly lower average price, however, they have a much 488 lower standard deviation, than found historically (see Table 2). In reality the 489 shadow price is impacted when the system is under stress, for example, when 490 there are large errors in demand or wind forecasts, or if there are unforeseen 491 faults or constraints on the system. The simulation model assumes perfect 492 forecasts for demand and wind, and cannot take these other unforeseen events 493 into account, and as such is likely to underestimate the magnitude and range of 494 the shadow price. The total annual cost of dispatch for the system as simulated 495 by the unit commitment model with wind is  $\in 1,045$  million, which is 11.5%496 below the actual cost of  $\in 1,180$  million in 2009. 497

Notwithstanding the fact that the unit commitment model underestimates the shadow price and its standard deviation, the simulated values of the shadow price with and without wind are consistent with one another. Thus, we can compare the differences in prices across the two simulations to determine the relative impact of wind on prices.

As can be seen from Table 6, wind generation is seen to reduce the average shadow price in the unit commitment model. Examining the simulation results more closely we can determine the average savings from each MWh of wind <sup>506</sup> for each hour of the day. This is illustrated in Figure 3.

Fig. 3. Average hourly savings per MWh of wind from the unit commitment model

Note: Wind savings are plotted on the primary y-axis and average shadow prices from the unit commitment model without wind are plotted on the secondary y-axis. Wind savings are in  $\in$ /MWh per MWh of wind energy produced.

As seen in the econometric model, the unit commitment model finds greater savings attributable to wind during the day when prices are higher compared to at night. In fact, both models find maximum benefits during the peak hour of 6pm. While the general pattern is comparable with the econometric model, the unit commitment model finds greater savings on average particularly in the early morning and late evening hours (of 10pm to 8am).

The overall savings attributable to wind in the unit commitment model are calculated according to the following formula:

$$\Sigma Savings_t = \Sigma (Price without wind_t - Price with wind_t) * (Demand_t)$$
(8)

<sup>513</sup> Overall, the simulation model finds that wind generation results in an average <sup>514</sup> saving of  $\in 0.0045$ /MWh per MWh of wind generation. This is approximately <sup>515</sup> 25% higher than that estimated by the econometric model which found an <sup>516</sup> average saving of  $\in 0.0034$ /MWh. Overall, the unit commitment model esti-<sup>517</sup> mates an annual dispatch saving of  $\in 59.5$  million, which represents a saving <sup>518</sup> of 5.38% compared to the total simulated dispatch cost ( $\in 1.045$  million). As

shown previously, the econometric model showed a dispatch saving of  $\in 46.99$ million from wind, which represented 4% of actual total dispatch costs (of  $\in 1,180$  million). Thus, we see a difference of just  $\in 12.6$  million, or 1.4%, between the two methods.

This difference in results between the two methodologies could be accounted for through the impact of uncertainty of demand, wind and generation outages between the econometric and unit commitment models. It may be the case that the value of perfect demand and wind forecasts relative to what was available in 2009 could be of the order of this  $\in 12.6$  million per annum but it is likely there are other factors to also consider, thus further research would be required before this conclusion could be made.

In summary, both the econometric and the unit commitment model find that wind results in a cost saving to the Irish electricity market in 2009. They find that the level of this saving is non-trivial and results in a market dispatch saving of between 4 - 5.4%. Given that both models provide similar results using very different methods, the results can be considered compelling and a more reliable representation of reality than if just one method was utilised.

### 536 6 Discussion

The results above demonstrate the marginal price savings as a results of wind using two very different methodologies. Both methodologies show a reduction

in the marginal price as a result of wind generation with findings in line with the existing literature in the field. The econometric model finds savings in the order of  $\in 3.40$ /MWh for each additional GWh of wind, compared to the unit commitment model which finds savings of  $\in 4.54$ /MWh.

The key contribution of this work was to not only examine the impact of wind, and the nature of that impact, on the price but to also compare two methodological approaches, namely an econometric and a unit commitment approach. The results in this paper indicate that the two methodologies are highly comparable and lead to a difference in savings of just 1.4%. However, it should be noted that both methods have their strengths and weaknesses and may not be perfect substitutes depending on the analysis required.

The econometric model is a much simpler approach and may be favoured by 550 policy makers due to relatively small data requirements. For example, in this 551 paper, the only data required were time series data of the price, demand, 552 wind and fuel prices. No information was required on the exact nature of 553 the generating units nor technicalities like reserve and unit constraints. As 554 such, depending on the type of analysis required, an econometric approach 555 will result in significant computational and data savings compared to a unit 556 commitment approach. 557

<sup>558</sup> However, the main drawback of the econometric approach is that it is an ex-<sup>559</sup> post analysis and as such it requires a significant level of wind generation to

be already present on the system. As such, it may be a useful tool for poli-560 cymakers who are considering the impacts of increasing penetrations of wind 561 from already moderate levels, however, it is unlikely to provide much insight 562 when penetration levels are low or non-existant. In these cases, a simulation 563 model, such as a unit commitment model is likely to be preferable. Although, 564 it should be noted that an econometric approach may be of value to policy-565 makers in systems with low levels of installed capacity in circumstances where 566 renewables contribute significantly to instantaneous consumption. For exam-567 ple, in this study, renewables met over 40% of demand during certain hours 568 despite an installed capacity of just 8%. 569

Given its sophistication, the unit commitment model is likely to continue to 570 be the gold standard model in terms of power system planning and design, 571 however, despite some of its limitations, the econometric model is still consid-572 ered useful for policymakers in a number of respects. Firstly, the econometric 573 analysis can be completed very quickly and provide indicative measurements 574 for officials who are often trying to meet tight budgetary cycles and may not 575 have the time, or the in-house expertise, to run the sophisticated unit com-576 mitment models. Secondly, the econometric model is likely to be easier to 577 explain/interpret than the unit commitment model for use in educating non-578 experts in the field (be they policy makers or the general public). For example, 579 the econometric model may be easier to explain and be more convincing for 580 a Minister for Finance/Treasury than the simulated unit commitment model. 581

Thirdly, the transparency of the econometric model represents a significant ad-582 vantage for policy makers compared to the black-box nature of a unit commit-583 ment model. Greater transparency often leads to improved stakeholder buy-in 584 and increases the potential for engaged and educated debate. Fourthly, the 585 relatively small amount of data required means that the econometric model 586 would be a much more cost effective method of analysis than using a unit 587 commitment model. This would be particularly important in a decentralised 588 system where it is often the case that the local government controls the bud-589 get. The ability of local governments to handle and assess information from 590 unit commitment models may be limited and could require costly and time 591 consuming consultants. In this regard, the econometric model is likely to be 592 a significantly more cost-effective way to determine the impact of renewables 593 on the electricity prices for the local community without the need to employ 594 complex unit commitment tools and potentially costly consultants. 595

Neither the econometric model nor the unit commitment model in this paper 596 took account of load and wind forecast errors (due to a lack of data availabil-597 ity), however, it is likely that these factors impacted on the lower variability 598 in the prices simulated by the unit commitment model. As such, it is possible 590 that the estimates of the savings due to wind in this paper are slightly over-600 estimated, especially if times of high wind forecast error are correlated with 601 times of high wind output. However, load forecast errors are also omitted in 602 this work and it may be the case that these two errors combined have a lower 603

<sup>604</sup> impact than each individually, although further research is required in this
<sup>605</sup> area. The impact of errors may also be influenced by the manner in which the
<sup>606</sup> power system is operated and the extent to which the market relies on wind
<sup>607</sup> power forecasts in determining dispatch schedules. This is considered beyond
<sup>608</sup> the scope of this paper but is an area of interest for further research.

Strategic behaviour by generators, which may influence prices, is also not considered in either approach. While this is not considered to be an issue in the shadow price component of the Irish electricity market, it may be an issue in other payments to generators in Ireland and in other markets (DiCosmo and Malaguzzi Valeri, 2014; Robinson and Baniak, 2002).

The results presented in this paper illustrate that the value of wind genera-614 tion varies throughout the day depending on both the wind output and the 615 demand at any given time. Ireland is fortunate to have a rich wind resource, 616 the output of which is more closely aligned with demand patterns than may 617 be experienced in other systems. Ireland does not have a large air condition-618 ing demand, thus electricity demand peaks during the winter months which 619 corresponds with when wind output is also likely to be highest. Additionally, 620 wind output in Ireland tends to be higher during the day rather than at night 621 which also corresponds with demand, although there is significant variation 622 on a day to day basis. As such, the impact of wind generation may be seen to 623 be greater in Ireland than in other countries. Notwithstanding this, the wind 624 and demand regime should not overly influence a comparison of the econo-625

metric and unit commitment models and either approach can be considered
appropriate for an ex-post analysis.

As wind penetrations increase in an electricity system it is likely that the 628 underlying system will evolve to allow for greater flexibility, for example by 629 increasing interconnection, storage, flexible generation, demand response etc. 630 This can be seen in Ireland where, by the end of 2015, installed wind pene-631 trations reached 3084 MW, representing 24% of electricity demand for 2015, 632 which was facilitated in part by a new 500MW HVDC interconnector to Great 633 Britain to reduce the isolation of the Irish system. As the econometric model 634 is an ex-post model, it has the capacity to capture actual changes in the un-635 derlying system. In other words, were this study to be undertaken for 2015, 636 the actual flows on the new interconnector could be accounted for implicitly 637 by deducting them from *NetDemand* in the model specified in equation (2)638 or by explicitly including the flows as an additional explanatory variable in 639 equation (2). In fact, the flexibility of the econometric model in this manner 640 may make it more adaptable than a unit commitment model in terms of mod-641 ifying the participants in the market. However, it should be noted that the 642 more isolated the system, the easier it will be to confidently model the impacts 643 of wind generation (in respect of both the econometric and unit commitment 644 models). 645

The results in this paper are based on ex-post data for the year 2009. Given the different installed capacities and wind output profile, as well as demand,

fuel and carbon prices in other years, these numerical results are considered 648 to hold for the year 2009 only and extrapolation to other years or for other 649 systems should be done with extreme caution. This paper found that the 650 two methodologies of econometric modelling and unit commitment simulation 651 were comparable, however, the numeric results are specific to the underlying 652 system of study in 2009 (a system which may change with the introduction 653 of the single integrated European market). It is likely that policy makers in 654 other jurisdictions with gross pool markets will gain greater value from the 655 econometric model compared to jurisdictions with alternative market designs 656 and it is advised that further study be undertaken to evaluate the results 657 in the context of the single integrated European market as well as for other 658 market structures. 659

### 660 7 Conclusions and Policy Implications

In this paper we compare two methods for assessing the impact of wind on 661 system prices. We hypothesise that an ex-post econometric model should pro-662 duce similar results to a unit commitment model while being much more 663 efficient in terms of data requirements and computation time. Results indi-664 cate that both models result in costs savings as a result of wind generation 665 on the Irish system. The econometric model indicates an average saving to 666 the system marginal price of  $\in 3.40$ /MWh per GWh of wind output, while the 667 unit commitment model indicates a saving of  $\in 4.54/\text{GWh}$ . This difference of 668

approximately 25% in the estimated saving per MWh of wind between the two 669 models is non-trivial and is likely due to the fact that the simulation model 670 assumes perfect forecasts for demand and wind. The simulation model cannot 671 take unforeseen events into account and therefore under-estimates the total 672 costs of running the system. This results in the likely over estimation of the 673 savings attributable to wind generation in the simulation model. It is pos-674 sible that a more sophisticated unit commitment model, which accounts for 675 forecast errors, would produce results more closely aligned to the economet-676 ric model, thus further work is recommended in the area of simulation model 677 development. 678

Both models show that the value of wind varies throughout the day and reaches 679 its maximum benefit during the peak hour of 6pm. Over the course of the year 680 2009 the models indicate that wind generation resulted in a market dispatch 681 saving of between 4 - 5.4% depending on the methodological approach. Thus, 682 the impact of the methodological approach on results is of the order of 1.4%. 683 Given the comparability of the results from both approaches, it is concluded 684 that depending on the type of analysis required, an ex-post econometric model 685 may be preferable to an ex-post unit commitment model given the significant 686 reduction in data requirements and computational time involved. 687

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Fuel Type	Percentage of	Percentage of	Average Marginal Cost
	installed capacity	electricity consumption	€/MWh
Natural Gas	57	57	42.57
Coal	18	14	36.22
Peat	12	9	51.63
Renewables	8	14.1	0
Oil	4	3	129.33

Table 1				
Ireland's	electricity	supply	in	2009

Note: Data on installed capacity and share of electricity consumption is for 2009 and is sourced from SEAI (2010b). Marginal costs are nominal and are based on average disclosed daily generator bids from 2009 sourced from SEM (2013). Marginal costs are based on fuel prices, carbon prices and average unit efficiencies. Marginal cost data is provided for the peat-fired stations for reference purposes only as they have must-run status in the Irish electricity market and in reality are dispatched regardless of marginal price.

J .2					
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Shadow price ( $\in$ /MWh)	8736	36.22	14.63	4.12	243.34
Net demand (MWh)	8736	3522	726	1743	6114
Wind (MWh)	8736	423	257	11.27	1183
Gas $( \in )$	8736	34.59	13.29	15.51	77.09
Coal $(\in)$	8736	51.18	5.44	44.12	65.04
Oil $( \in )$	8736	44.35	6.86	28.16	53.74
Carbon ( $\in$ )	8736	13.36	1.54	8.2	15.9

Table 2Summary Statistics

Note: Observations for shadow price and net demand were not available for all hours on 1st January 2009, thus the time series commences on 2nd January and continues until 31st December 2009 inclusive. The number of observations reflects these 364 days with 24 observations per day. In reality, the Irish Single Electricity Market is settled four days ex-post, thus the shadow price used here is the 4 day ex-post price and represents the actual price paid to generators (SEM, 2013).

Variables	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 1c	Model 1d	Model 1e
NetDemand	0.0146***	0.0142***			-0.0149***
	(0.0007)	(0.0007)			(0.0030)
$\rm NetD^2$			0.0000***	0.0000***	0.0000***
			(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Wind		-0.0030***	-0.0029***		-0.0053***
		(0.0005)	(0.0005)		(0.0018)
$Wind^2$				-0.0000***	0.0000
				(0.0000)	(0.0000)
$\operatorname{Gas}_{t-24}$	0.390***	0.401***	0.382***	$0.378^{***}$	0.380***
	(0.0338)	(0.0340)	(0.033)	(0.0327)	(0.0327)
$\operatorname{Coal}_{t-24}$	0.158	0.163	0.153	0.151	0.129
	(0.129)	(0.127)	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.124)
$\operatorname{Oil}_{t-24}$	$0.441^{***}$	$0.488^{***}$	$0.474^{***}$	$0.469^{***}$	$0.427^{***}$
	(0.0738)	(0.074)	(0.0710)	(0.071)	(0.070)
$\operatorname{Carbon}_{t-24}$	0.840***	0.828***	0.710***	$0.714^{***}$	$0.553^{***}$
	(0.189)	(0.187)	(0.1178)	(0.178)	(0.174)
Constant	-59.13***	-59.08***	-31.34***	-31.55***	2.188
	(9.484)	(9.365)	(8.831)	(8.878)	(10.56)
Rho	0.301	0.295	0.286	0.287	0.294
Durbin Watson stat	2.05	2.04	2.04	2.05	2.06
R-squared	0.587	0.593	0.611	0.610	0.611
AIC	60068	60029	59727	59734	59629
BIC	60401	60369	60067	60074	59983
Observations	8736	8736	8736	8736	8736

Table 3Basic Regression Model Results

Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## Table 4

Centred Regression Model Results

Variables	Model 2a	Model 2b	
NetDemandcentred	0.0142***	0.0119***	
	(0.0001)	(0.0004)	
${\rm NetDemand centred}^2$		0.0000***	
		(0.0000)	
Windcentred	-0.0030***	-0.0034***	
	(0.0005)	(0.0006)	
$Windcentred^2$		0.0000	
		(0.0000)	
$\operatorname{Gas}_{t-24}$	0.401***	0.380***	
	(0.033)	(0.033)	
$\operatorname{Coal}_{t-24}$	0.163	0.129	
	(0.127)	(0.124)	
$\operatorname{Oil}_{t-24}$	0.488***	0.427***	
	(0.074)	(0.070)	
$Carbon_{t-24}$	0.828***	0.553***	
	(0.187)	(0.174)	
Constant	-10.28	-4.926	
	(9.06)	(8.821)	
Rho	0.295	0.294	
Durbin Watson statistic	2.05	2.06	
R-squared	0.593	0.611	
AIC	60030	55963	
BIC	60370	59984	
Observations	8736	8736	

Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

VARIARIES	Interaction Model				
NetDemendsontrod					
NetDemandcentred	$(0.0120^{-1.0})$				
Not Domon doop trod2	(0.0004)				
NetDemandcentred-	(0.0000)				
117. 1 1 19	(0.000)				
Windcentred <sup>2</sup>	0.0000				
0	0.0000				
$\operatorname{Gas}_{t-24}$	0.379***				
	(0.0325)				
$\operatorname{Coal}_{t-24}$	0.0691				
0.1	(0.05)				
$\operatorname{Oil}_{t-24}$	0.408***				
	(0.064)				
$\operatorname{Carbon}_{t-24}$	$0.506^{***}$				
	0.159				
Wind*00:00	0.0001	Wind*08:00	-0.0047***	Wind*16:00	-0.0063 ***
	0.0007		(0.0010)		(0.0011)
Wind*01:00	-0.0002	Wind*09:00	-0.0047***	Wind*17:00	-0.0015
	(0.0005)		(0.0014)		(0.0049)
Wind*02:00	-0.0008	Wind*10:00	-0.0047***	Wind*18:00	-0.0101***
	(0.0006)		(0.0016)		(0.0039)
Wind*03:00	-0.0015***	Wind*11:00	-0.0041***	Wind*19:00	-0.0052
	(0.0006)		(0.0010)		(0.00315)
Wind*04:00	-0.0016***	Wind*12:00	-0.0032***	Wind*20:00	-0.0037**
	(0.0006)		(0.0009)		(0.0016)
Wind*05:00	-0.0011**	Wind*13:00	-0.0043***	Wind*21:00	-0.0037**
	(0.0005)		(0.0009)		(0.00016)
Wind*06:00	-0.0009	Wind*14:00	-0.0049***	Wind*22:00	-0.0031***
	(0.0006)		(0.0010)		(0.0008)
Wind*07:00	-0.0030***	Wind*15:00	-0.0047***	Wind*23:00	-0.0016*
	(0.0009)		(0.0009)		(0.0008)
R-squared	0.933				
Rho	0.294				
DW statistic	2.06				
Observations	8,736				
	a 1 1				

Table 5 Hourly Results

Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Summa	ummary Statistics from the Unit Commitment Model						
	Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max		
	Shadow price without wind	35.57	6.47	15.28	69.02		
	Shadow price with wind	33.65	5.70	15.28	65.44		

 Table 6

 Summary Statistics from the Unit Commitment Model

# 791 List of Figures

- <sup>792</sup> Figure 1: Sample Merit Order Effect
- <sup>793</sup> Figure 2: Load & Shadow Price for the first business week in January 2009
- <sup>794</sup> Figure 3: Average hourly savings per MWh of wind from the unit commitment
- 795 model

50







Highlights:

- Impact of wind on electricity prices using economics and engineering methods
- Paper isolates the impact of modelling approach on the results
- The findings of both the economic and engineering approaches are comparable
- Wind provides power system savings of the order of 4 5.4% of total dispatch cost